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Based on anthropological fieldwork, this article studies the experience of two Dutch
peacekeeping units: the “Grizzly” artillery battery that was deployed to Kosovo in 1999
(KFOR2) and the “Bulldog” infantry company that was deployed to Bosnia in 2000
(SFOR8). By examining the units’ experience from training through deployment, this
article argues that the Dutch army is a threatened organization that suffers from a rela-
tively low status in society. The army gains support mainly by performing peace mis-
sions, which soldiers perceive as “feminine” and therefore inappropriate. This article
examines how Dutch soldiers train for peacekeeping missions and demonstrates that this
training takes the shape of infantry combat exercises, a characteristic that negatively
influences the soldiers’ level of satisfaction during deployments.
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What are the consequences if a society—but not its army—supports peacekeep-ing operations? How does a war machine train for peacekeeping? Does unit
proximity to combat core expertise influence its ability to perform peace missions?
This article answers these questions by focusing on two peacekeeping units: the
“Grizzly” artillery battery that was deployed to Kosovo in 1999 (KFOR2) and the
“Bulldog” infantry company that was deployed to Bosnia in 2000 (SFOR8). By exam-
ining these units’experience from training through deployment, this article argues that
the Dutch army is a threatened organization that suffers from a relatively low status in
society, especially as a consequence of the fall of Srebrenica in 1995, which turned out
to be the most important landmark in the relationship between military and society in
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the Netherlands. The army gains support mainly by performing peace mission, which
its soldiers perceive as “feminine” and therefore inappropriate. This perception
reflects the fact that Dutch soldiers train for peace missions by simulating combat.
Such training generates false expectations that lead soldiers to become dissatisfied
with the less violent nature of peacekeeping missions.
Although focused on preparation for armed conflict, Western militaries have grad-
ually begun to take part in peacekeeping operations in which their mission is mostly a
constabulary one. The American and British militaries are both good examples of this
tendency. As such, most of the existing research focuses on how the American and
British militaries combine both kinds of missions. In contrast, most European militar-
ies focus mainly on peace missions and are generally no longer involved in combat.
Therefore, their identity as predominantly peacekeeping organizations offers a good
case study of the relationship between the military, society, and peacekeeping.
Violence has long been monopolized by the state. Wars, claims Giddens, do not
exist as such in stateless societies.1 Weber, who saw violence and war as an inescap-
able part of the human condition, was the first to focus on the state as a warlike entity.2
Then, in 1960, Morris Janowitz refined Weber’s ideas about the relationship between
violence and the military by proposing his constabulary model, whereby soldiers
might handle those political crises that could be solved with armed intervention but
would not require all-out war. Janowitz’s students, especially Moskos3 and Segal,4
have continued his research. Yet none of their work examines the relationship between
soldiers’ training and their competence as peacekeepers—or lack of it.
The bulk of research does not capture the full depth of how training affects peace-
keeping for two reasons. First, it focuses on military organizations that still have a pri-
mary interest in preparing for armed conflict. Second, it is quantitative in nature or
concerned with limited aspects of research. Therefore, it cannot uncover the internal
tensions inherent to the transformation from a war-fighting to a peacekeeping military.
In particular, it cannot answer the question of how peacekeeping is perceived and per-
formed by soldiers. Moreover, we still do not have a full and coherent picture of non-
American peacekeeping forces.
The study of military and peacekeeping is largely neglected in cultural anthropol-
ogy.5 This is because anthropological research usually focuses on the victims of vio-
lent acts rather than on the perpetrators. Therefore, the aim of this article is to bring
violence back into cultural anthropology and military studies by discussing its mean-
ing and implications in the context of peacekeeping missions.
This article argues that the Dutch army is a threatened organization because it suf-
fers from a relatively low status in Dutch society, especially after the massacre in
Srebrenica in 1995. Then, the article underscores how Dutch soldiers perceive the
army as a weak and feminine organization while viewing themselves as masculine and
fit for combat. The third section focuses on training for peace missions and how it
mimics combat exercises. The last section focuses on soldiers’attitudes toward peace-
keeping missions and argues that such attitudes determine the soldiers’ level of
satisfaction with their mission.
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Dutch Society and the Army
The Dutch army, like other Western European armies nowadays, must justify its
existence to the public more than ever because the public perceives a decline in the
intensity of direct and current threats to the national territory. Instead, the public relies
on the military to perform the nobler, but probably less dangerous or demanding, tasks
involved in humanitarian missions.6 In general, national security policy is increasingly
being defined by public opinion, domestic politics, and economic constraints.7
If the probability of war defines the relationship between armed forces and their
host society,8 then Dutch society can be best described as a “warless society.” Moskos
argues that warless societies may be what the armed forces of Western Europe and the
North Atlantic are moving toward: a transition from a large standing force to a small
cadre backed by reserve forces. Along these lines, Haltiner argues that the shift away
from mass armed forces is most likely under three conditions: first, when a country
can enjoy the security benefits to be had from membership in a defensive alliance
(such as NATO); second, when the country concerned is relatively distant from a clear
and present military danger to its national sovereign territory; and third, when the
country frequently participates in international peace-support operations.9
Despite its imperial past, Dutch society matches this profile, and as Olivier and
Teitler argue, the Netherlands has lived contentedly for centuries under Anglo-Saxon
protection.10 Priding itself on a neutral stance in international matters, the Netherlands
knew that neither Britain nor the United States could afford to lose control of the Low
Countries to an opposing great power. In accordance with such a perspective, the
Dutch perceived the development of their armed forces as less of a priority than eco-
nomic and social matters. This feeling became stronger with the collapse of the com-
munist regimes in both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself. Thereafter, West-
ern nations no longer deployed their armed forces to deter a known adversary but
rather to maintain or enforce peace in regions where their interests were in jeopardy or
where human rights were being abused.11
As a result, the armed forces in the Netherlands and the Dutch population in general
seem to have assumed a self-image of “nonmartial”12 or “unheroic behavior.”13 In addi-
tion, the Dutch are known for their pacifist attitudes and limited trust in military insti-
tutions.14 As such, the status of the Dutch military and the level of Dutch public’s trust
in the armed forces are definitely lower than they are in the United Kingdom, in
France, or in the United States.
On September 1, 1996, the Dutch military became an all-volunteer force focusing
mainly on peacekeeping missions. Over the past thirty years, the Dutch armed forces
have become involved in nearly thirty peace-support, humanitarian, and disaster-
relief operations. Support operations and peacekeeping missions enjoy widespread
support in the Netherlands, even after the abysmal results of the Srebrenica operation
in 1995.15
The Dutch armed forces were deeply influenced by the tragic and traumatic events
that took place at Srebrenica when the UNPROFOR Dutchbat airmobile brigade
assigned to protect the Muslim enclave failed to do so. As a result, over seven thousand
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Muslim men were imprisoned and killed by Bosnian Serbian military units. It took the
Serbs a week to conquer and ethnically cleanse the safe area. They met little resistance
from the four thousand Muslim soldiers in the enclave, from the four hundred Dutch
peacekeepers deployed there, or from UNPROFOR as a whole.16
The massacre provoked an eruption of public anger in the Netherlands. Both the
press and members of the parliament began to ask embarrassing questions and
attacked what they perceived to be the “passivity” or even “cowardliness” of the Dutch
UN soldiers.17 On August 4, 1995, the headline of the weekly newspaper HP/De Tijd
declared that Dutch soldiers were “too sweet and innocent for war.” In numerous arti-
cles, the fall of the Srebrenica enclave was listed among a string of Dutch military
defeats ranging from the German invasion of May 1940, to the colonial wars in the for-
mer Dutch East Indies and Dutch New Guinea, up to and including peace missions
such as those in the Balkans. From the perspective of the media, the Dutch armed
forces were nothing but losers.18
The events of Srebrenica turned out to be the most important landmark in the rela-
tionship between military and society in the Netherlands and diminished the status of
the military even further. In the following years, there were several investigations of
the massacre, the last and most extensive of which was conducted by the Dutch Insti-
tute for War Documentation in Amsterdam (NIOD). When NIOD published its final
report on April 10, 2002, the government resigned. The report stated that the Dutch
soldiers in Srebrenica did their best given the situation.19
Method
From the fall of 1999 to the summer of 2000, anthropological fieldwork was con-
ducted with the cooperation of the Dutch army. The research was conducted with two
Dutch peacekeeping units: the Grizzly artillery battery, which was deployed in
Kosovo (KFOR2), and the Bulldog infantry company, which was deployed in Bosnia
(SFOR8). While conducting research, there was full access to the soldiers. In general,
the army allowed observing almost everything without having a military escort. As
part of the fieldwork, the units were accompanied from the first stages of their training
with the Dutch brigade at Seedorf, Germany, through their combat and peacekeeping
training in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The research was conducted by
living with the soldiers and participating in their activities, such as day and night
marches, theoretical and practical military studies, and off-duty activities such as eat-
ing and socializing in the camp’s bar and club, watching TV, and so on. Moreover, sev-
eral periods of time were spent with the soldiers during their deployment in Kosovo
and Bosnia, where they were joined on operational activities such as patrols, manning
checkpoints and guard missions, and off-duty activities such as a guided tour of
Sarajevo. Seventy soldiers and commanders were interviewed during training and
deployment. All interviews were recorded and then transcribed. Also, soldiers’peace-
keeping classes and training sessions were recorded, as well as various other lectures.
The interviews, as well as fieldwork, were conducted in the Dutch language.
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The problem of obtaining access to data looms large in ethnography. Nowhere is
this problem more acute than in institutionalized organizations—such as the mili-
tary—where access depends completely on the goodwill of gatekeepers. Therefore, it
is not surprising that there are few civilians who study the military and that most of the
research is done by scholars who are affiliated with military academies, serve in the
military,20 have relations in the military organization,21 or have special access through
government agencies.22
In contrast to such scholars, this research studies soldiers with a different language
and culture than that of the researcher. Only rarely have scholars studied a foreign mil-
itary, and this kind of research is mainly focused on interviews not on participant
observation.23 The unique position as a foreign (Israeli) participant observer who
speaks Dutch enables me to portray Dutch soldiers and present an extensive analysis
of the Dutch military from an “outsider’s perspective.”
The Soldiers in Infantry and Artillery Units
Most of the soldiers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in Grizzly and Bulldog
were in their early twenties, yet the infantry soldiers were slightly younger than the
artillerymen. As we can see in Table 1, the typical age in the infantry was eighteen to
twenty-one, while in the artillery, it was twenty-two to twenty-four. NCOs were older:
twenty-four to twenty-six in the infantry and twenty-seven to thirty-five in the artil-
lery. One infantry soldier, several artillery soldiers, and the infantry’s company com-
mander were married with children, but most of the soldiers, NCOs, and officers lived
together with a girlfriend without being officially married.
About a third of the soldiers came from families where fathers, uncles, or brothers
served in the military, usually as NCOs. The fathers of other soldiers included farmers,
factory workers or foremen, a Protestant clergyman, small-business owners, a garbage
collector, the headwaiter in a restaurant, a road-construction worker, a policeman, and
some unemployed. Their mothers were largely housewives, but some worked as
nursemaids, catering workers, cleaners, religious instructors, and factory workers.
Some were unemployed.
The soldiers considered their salaries (deployment allowances included) to be quite
high in comparison with blue-collar incomes in the Dutch market. The soldiers
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Table 1
Similarities between the Units: Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Soldiers
Sociodemographic Characteristics Infantry (Bulldog) Artillery (Grizzly)
Soldiers’ ages 18-21 22-24
Noncommissioned Officers’ ages 24-26 27-35
Blue-collar background yes yes
Low education yes yes
Place of residency Mostly villages and small towns Mostly villages and small towns
claimed to have better work conditions than their parents and to earn more. Since most
of them did not have a high school diploma, they saw their army service as a good
career choice, at least for several years while saving up money. The army provides
these soldiers with a steady salary and other opportunities such as free driving lessons
and low-level vocational studies such as security and hotel hygiene. It also gives them
a rather diverse and challenging working environment that does not demand extensive
qualifications.
Artillery NCO: If you are a young guy of eighteen years old and you look for a job in the civil
society, you get a minimum salary. The guys who serve here are paid well. And there are
people here who serve for the money.
Infantry soldier: After all, and this is one of the most important reasons, it pays pretty well.
That was the main reason.
The soldiers are passionate about sports and physical activity. They love to be outdoors
and to do “something with their hands,” as many say. One infantry soldier said, “I don’t
like doing nothing. I cannot sit still and cannot go to an office everyday. No, I cannot do
it. I must stay busy.” Most of the soldiers prefer physical work to office work. As a
twenty-three-year-old infantry soldier said, “I would like to sit in an office when I’m
getting old, at the age of thirty but not before.” Even during conversations, the soldiers
could not sit or stand still. Thus, they gave off a rather hyperactive impression.
About 70 percent of the soldiers and officers in Grizzly and Bulldog come from vil-
lages or small towns. It is not common to find people from big cities such as Rotterdam
and Den Haag in the economic center (or Randstad) of the Netherlands. It is even rarer
to find initials from Amsterdam, which the soldiers perceive as having a different
mentality. Amsterdam is a city where, as several soldiers explained, “we are not liked.”
Table 1 summarizes the similarities between the units.
However, despite being combat units, artillery and infantry units have a different
culture and a different mentality as a result of their different missions.24 Artillery sol-
diers usually work behind the lines where they are not directly exposed to the enemy,
while infantry soldiers aim to contact the enemy and to fight him face to face. The
operational modes of infantry and artillery units and especially their relative proximity
to the enemy influence the social structure and self-image of the units because service
in combat units is directly related to status. Criteria of service establish certain kinds of
power relations among men, and as a result, the operational modes of infantry and
artillery influence the social structure and self-image of the units. Infantry soldiers
have a more prestigious and masculine self-image than do artillery soldiers, whose
self-image is shaped in the shadow of the infantry as second best:
Artillery soldier: It was my third choice, the artillery . . . after commandos and infantry.
Artillery NCO: I wanted to join the infantry. That was my first choice. Choice number two
was cavalry and choice number three was artillery.
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Infantry soldiers, on the other hand, have a professional pride and higher self-esteem.
Most chose the infantry and are satisfied with their decision. They perceive the infan-
try as the only “real” military—real in the sense of doing a physical and dirty job that
involves direct confrontation with the enemy and, therefore, with danger:
Infantry NCO: To me, infantry is still the only real military . . . camouflage on your face and
getting into the mud, this is great.
Infantry soldier: For me, infantry is . . . fighting.
Infantry officer: Personally, I look for action and this is why I volunteered.
Soldiers’ Self-Images
An important part of soldiers’self-image is masculinity. Of all the sites where mas-
culinities are constructed, reproduced, and carried out, those associated with war and
the military are some of the most direct. Despite far-reaching political, social, and
technological changes, the warrior still seems to be a key symbol of masculinity and
obtains the masculine hegemonic image.25
However, sociological and anthropological studies of the link between military and
masculinities have tended to focus almost overwhelmingly on infantry and airborne
soldiers.26 Neither has much been written on masculinity in European militaries, espe-
cially peacekeeping among soldiers, whose self-image faces different challenges than
that of combat soldiers. Therefore, it is fascinating to find that the images of masculin-
ity among Grizzly and especially Bulldog (names that themselves are symbols of
power and masculinity) match those of combat soldiers in the American, British, and
Israeli militaries.27 For example, an infantry group commander said,
Infantry is the “Tour of Duty,” it is walking in the woods with real men, camouflaged,
with full gear and . . . your weapon is ready, loaded. You enjoy walking in the woods and if
you see the enemy you attack . . . weather or no weather, rain or no rain, it doesn’t matter,
you must function. This is the infantry, sleeping outside, having a tough time, hardly eat-
ing, hardly sleeping, and only fight.
This group commander is experiencing his army service in terms of masculine adven-
ture, of “walking in the woods with real men” in every sort of climate condition and
weather. The experience that he describes is not very realistic; his chances of partici-
pating in a real fight are miniscule. However, it is the image that is important here, an
image of physical and mental hardships in the company of other “real men.” This con-
cept is also salient in the words of an artillery soldier, although the artillerymen’s mas-
culine self-image is usually more subtle and relaxed than that of the infantry.
Artillery soldier: This is a job for real men. . . . A real man is someone who is sturdy, who
doesn’t get scared quickly, and is ready for action . . . if a clerk will try to do our work, then
he’ll be done for in a week. You must be a person who likes living outdoors and doing
stuff.
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Soldiers’ image of the army as a masculine adventure resembles what Kimmel and
Kaufman term “weekend warriors”: men who join workshops, retreats, and seminars
in the United States and Canada to retrieve the “warrior within,” or the “Wildman.”28
These movements reenact experiences from nonindustrial cultures such as initiation
rites and other ceremonies to connect to nature and the wilderness. Kimmel and
Kaufman explain these rituals in the context of both the increasing crisis of masculin-
ity in past decades and the increasingly widespread confusion over the meaning of
manhood. Traditional definitions of masculinity rested on economic autonomy: con-
trol over one’s labor and self-reliance in the workplace. The public arena, the space in
which men habitually demonstrated and proved their manhood, was racially and sexu-
ally homogenous, a homosocial world in which straight, white men could be them-
selves, without fear of the Other. Economic autonomy, coupled with public patriarchy,
gave men a secure sense of themselves as men. The soldiers in Grizzly and Bulldog
share the same fantasy of a man’s society that grants no access to either women or gay
men.
29 It should be emphasized that infantry soldiers have a stronger masculine self-
image than artillerymen. Table 2 summarizes the differences between the units.
Soldiers’ Image of the Army
The Dutch military is in a terrible situation. There is no money, the morale is bad and the
drama of Srebrenica doesn’t go away.
—General Major Van Vuren30
As we saw, the Dutch army suffers from a relatively low image in society, but at the
same time, Grizzly and Bulldog soldiers maintain a strong combat-oriented masculine
image. The soldiers cope with this paradox by criticizing the army for its lack of fight-
ing attitude and for insufficient combat-training experience. They separate between
what they perceive as their higher qualities as fighters and the army’s generally
reduced capacity to fight, and they complain that the army has become too feminine. A
feminine army or a nonaggressive army is an army that “if [it] will have to fight another
country, will hundred percent sure lose”—the result of “too many politicians” and a
“tolerant society” whose “mentality suits peace more than combat.” Soldiers envy
other, more aggressive militaries.
Infantry officer: I think that [the army] is soft. I know for sure that in any case the Dutch
infantry will never be in a situation that will endanger soldiers’ lives, the Netherlands
won’t accept it.
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Table 2
Differences between Infantry and Artillery: Operational Mode and Self-Image
Martial Characteristics Infantry (Bulldog) Artillery (Grizzly)
Operational mode Aim to fight enemy face to face Work behind the lines
Professional pride and self-esteem High In the shadow of infantry
Masculine self-image Combat-oriented masculine image Lower self-image
Many soldiers, especially from the infantry, feel discouraged about their miniscule
prospects of seeing combat. During their deployment to Bosnia, infantry soldiers even
asked me to pass a message to the high command in The Hague, expressing their wish
to fight.
How can soldiers who serve in an army that has not seen combat since 1948
develop such belligerent feelings and maintain a masculine self-image? In the next
sections, we shall see that the army partially resolves this paradox by transforming
peacekeeping training into combat exercises and by viewing peace missions as ori-
ented toward infantry-type combat. The unintended effect of this combatlike training
is to enhance soldiers’disappointment in actual peace missions, during which combat
is extremely rare.
Peacekeeping Training
This military thinks about war, prepares for war, and simulates war, but does not wage
war.
—J. S. van der Meulen31
About two months before deployment, the Bulldog and Grizzly soldiers started
their peacekeeping training. Although this training is fairly standard worldwide, not
much has been written on it, and none of the existing research was done in a partici-
pant-observation manner.32 Yet the training process has special dynamics that can be
better understood through participant observation, which succeeds also in unfolding
the contradictory and paradoxical nature of the training.
The most striking thing about this training is not its rather short length but the level
to which it emphasizes infantry combat core expertise. Most of the training, which is
similar for infantry and artillery soldiers, is engaged with shooting, assaulting, and
marching exercises. Even when the trainees are artillery soldiers, the main model and
the core expertise are those of the infantry. Only the last two and a half weeks are actu-
ally devoted to peacekeeping training, but even then, the drills sometimes take the
shape of combat exercise.
Peacekeeping training starts with a week of combat exercise in Bergen, Germany.
During that week, the soldiers are mainly engaged in shooting exercises, first using
moving targets and eventually participating in a live fire squad and company exer-
cise.33 Although this training is defined as peacekeeping, it is actually infantry combat
training. For example, during the exercise briefing, the commander explains to the sol-
diers how to move about in the area and when to stop and hide. He emphasizes that
these instructions are also good for war situations when the soldiers have to be aware
of the enemy. He repeats the word war over and over again. When asked why they train
for combat, another commander explains, “To be a good policeman one must be a
good soldier. A soldier can become a policeman but a policeman cannot become a
soldier.”
The next exercise was a social-patrol maneuver, one of the basic concepts of peace-
keeping in which soldiers learn how to march in daylight, “showing the flag” or, in
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other words, showing their presence to the local population in the goal of keeping law
and order. This exercise also transformed into combat training. Instead of marching
during the day, the final social-patrol exercise took place late at night and alters into
combat marching, which ended with a shooting exercise in the morning.
The only training that focused entirely on peacekeeping skills took place as five
days of classes in the MGO (Missie Gerichte Opleiding), Mission Related Training
Center for peacekeeping training in the Netherlands. The classes, each lasting an hour
and half, given mainly by army instructors but also by psychologists, deal with issues
such as hygiene, safety, mine awareness, psychological preparation, preparing home
and family for the deployment, foreign weapons, and first contact with the locals.
The highlight of the preparations for deployment and the main peacekeeping exer-
cise is the eindoefening (final exercise), which is a role-playing in Vogelsang, Bel-
gium. For nine days, soldiers, mainly from infantry and reconnaissance with peace-
keeping experience, reenacted Kosovo by role-playing as Albanians and Serbs.
Female soldiers played their wives. Professional actors played the local population,
dressed up in local clothes and with professional makeup, and held plastic babies. The
army even rented civilian cars for the “Albanians” and “Serbs” to use. The soldiers
built “local villages,” cutting wood for fire or taking care of chickens, which were
wandering around.
Most of the exercises and simulations during final training were aimed at teaching
the soldiers how to handle hostile and even dangerous locals. In such simulations,
“locals” kidnapped soldiers, offered the soldiers prostitutes, sexually harassed a
female soldier, told soldiers “mussels from Brussels go home,” and called soldiers
“homo.”
The simulation drills are dramatic and exciting. They are mostly aimed at “worst-
case scenarios” in which the soldiers had to confront dangerous locals. The restless
soldiers who played the role of the locals enjoyed irritating the soldiers to create some
drama and fun. Sometimes, the instructor would remind the soldiers that most of the
locals are innocent and poor and that only a small minority is guilty of war crimes. Yet,
in most of the simulations, locals are portrayed as a bunch of annoying teenagers. This
was a problem because during deployment, the soldiers faced low hostility.
The application of infantry combat skills to peacekeeping missions is common dur-
ing training. The instructors made it clear that peacekeeping skills are similar to skills
required for combat. For example, a peacekeeping instructor says that
a good peacekeeper is first of all a good combat soldier because sometimes peacekeepers
have to fight, for example, in Bosnia and Somalia. A good combat soldier is a good peace-
keeper because it is like writing a book. If you are a good writer, you write a long book in
the same methods you write a short book. The difference is in the technique, not in the
quality.
When infantry soldiers were asked what is the difference between combat and peace-
keeping training, they say that there is no difference. Combat training can also be use-
ful to peacekeeping. Cohesion, mutual trust, and command are ancillary skills or even
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byproducts of combat training. Yet the focus on combat is sweeping: “Peacekeeping is
pure infantry,” said one soldier. “The only difference is that in peacekeeping, as
opposed to regular patrols, we are allowed to talk and make noise because the aim is to
show our presence,” said another.
There are three explanations as to why peacekeeping training is largely combat ori-
ented. The first possible explanation is the reluctance of the army to accept its new role
and to shift its focus from combat to peace preparations. A senior Dutch officer
described a split within the army; the head of the military is still in the traditional
mindset of combat preparations, while the body deals with peacekeeping.34 As a mas-
culine institution, the military is traditionally eager to fight and avoid humanitarian or
social work, which is perceived as feminine. According to Janowitz, heroic leaders
tend to resist the constabulary concept because of their desire to maintain conventional
army doctrine and their reluctance to evaluate the political consequences of limited
army actions that do not produce “victory.”35 This can also be seen in the infantry sol-
diers’ reaction to the humanitarian aspects of the mission and their dissatisfaction, as
we shall see in the next section.
A second possible explanation for the emphasis on combat training is the fuzzy
environment in which the army functions. Peacekeeping operations take place in a
structurally different environment from the one in which soldiers traditionally oper-
ate. Faced with an environment that changed from monovalent to a multivalent,
blurred, “fuzzy” logic of friend/foe/nonfoe, the army needs to use new lenses to read a
reality in which the simplicity of the peace-war dichotomy is replaced by a complexity
of variables.36
One way for the army to deal with the confusion that is created by the fuzzy envi-
ronment is to train soldiers for the worst-case scenario—a complete deterioration of
security in the deployment area—and therefore to train them for combat. In compari-
son with other possible peacekeeping circumstances, the worst-case scenario is the
clearest. It makes a strong distinction between good and bad, black and white. Train-
ing for a worst-case scenario is also very similar to combat training, a type of training
that the commanders and soldiers know very well and are able to perform and mea-
sure. Measuring the success of combat training is much easier than measuring that of
humanitarian training.
Another major factor is the possibility that a worst-case scenario will become real-
ity. The army is haunted by the painful events in Srebrenica where Dutch soldiers
failed to deal with a worst-case scenario. These feelings were especially strong in the
infantry unit that some of the commanders experienced as soldiers in the fall of
Srebrenica in 1995. Extensive combat training was design to prevent the recurrence of
such a case.37
Three interrelated issues (the fuzzy environment, black-and-white training, and
combat core expertise) contribute to a feeling shared by many soldiers that training is
insufficient. Each unit, however, had a different opinion on what was missing. Artil-
lery soldiers who during peacekeeping training learned infantry drills for the first time
complained that they did not get enough infantry training, which could help them if a
worst-case scenario would arise. An artillery deputy battery commander said,
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No, [we did not have enough training] because we started the training too late, really in
the last moment, and you can see how it influenced the soldiers. . . . Especially infantry
training—I wish we had more time . . . but we are well prepared for the humanitarian
mission.
As the artillery deputy battery commander said, the soldiers felt more comfortable
with the humanitarian aspects of the mission than with combat tasks. On the other
hand, infantry soldiers did very well on the training that they called the “Eighty Years’
War in one week,” referring to a major seventeenth-century war with Spain. Naming
peace training after a heroic war reveals the soldiers’attitude toward the mission. This
attitude was enhanced by the experience of some of the commanders in Srebrenica in
1995. These commanders were especially cautious and emphasized combat readiness.
Yet the training did not prepare the soldiers to perform effectively the humanitarian
aspects of the mission. According to one infantry platoon commander,
We had eight weeks to work with the groups. . . . It was really too little but it went very
well. . . . We always say that the final exercise is the Eighty Years’ War in one week. We
know from the experience of the unit that currently deployed in Bosnia that it is rather
quiet there. There is very little work to do . . . in the very short training, people tried to
enact as many events as possible . . . and then it became unrealistic.
Despite having a quite similar training, Grizzly and Bulldog perceive and perform
peacekeeping missions in different ways. Artillery soldiers’ confidence has suffered
because their training emphasizes infantry skills. They question their ability to suc-
cessfully perform the mission. But their lower self-confidence as combatants has
caused them to be more challenged by the mission and therefore more satisfied in per-
forming it. Second, it also caused them to perceive the mission in a more humanitarian
way. Infantry soldiers, on the other hand, have been proud of their performances dur-
ing training and feel ready for deployment. They rejected the mission’s humanitarian
aspects in Bosnia because it was not as exciting as their training, and they felt frus-
trated and dissatisfied. The next section will focus on three attitudes that describe the
soldiers’ perceptions of the mission and, as a consequence, their satisfaction.
Deployment in Bosnia and Kosovo
Here [in Bosnia] I see that . . . a lot of the things they told me weren’t true . . . for example,
they tell you that every day, people come to the camp gates and scream or fight and curse
you. But it doesn’t happen. Many people do come to the gates to ask for help, not to
scream and curse you. . . . In the training, they said, “There is a lot for you to do there.”
Look! [in a cynical voice] if there are no patrols, we have nothing to do here!
—Infantry soldier in Bosnia
Infantry and artillery units were divided about mission determination. While most
of the infantry soldiers defined the mission as combat, artillerymen defined it as
humanitarian. The different attitudes shaped different levels of satisfaction for the
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mission. Infantry soldiers who defined the mission as combat were less satisfied than
were artillery soldiers who experienced the mission the same way, because they felt
unchallenged. Moreover, infantry soldiers who experienced the mission as combat
were also less satisfied than were soldiers (mostly artillery) who viewed the mission as
humanitarian. In other words, the proximity of the soldiers to infantry combat
expertise determined their satisfaction.
To examine how soldiers from the infantry and artillery experience their peace mis-
sions, a set of three attitudes that describe the soldiers’ perceptions of the mission will
be used: (1) the “warrior-strategy” attitude, (2) the “humanitarian-strategy” attitude,
and (3) peacekeeping as a civilian (or feminine) job. The first attitude was the most
common among soldiers of both units. The second attitude was common among artil-
lery soldiers, and the third attitude was supported by some infantry soldiers.
Warrior Strategy
Peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job but only a soldier can do it.
—UN official
For most soldiers, peacekeeping is considered to be a regular infantry mission or
part of what Miller and Moskos define as “warrior strategy.”38 As such, the mission is
viewed as potentially dangerous, and the locals are viewed as potential enemies.
Therefore, soldiers view the mission as demanding combat skills such as a tactical
way of thinking, very good physical ability, knowledge of the landscape, and handling
of mines.
For artillery soldiers, the mission in Kosovo was a unique opportunity to adopt the
warrior strategy, to experience infantry skills, and to prove their ability to perform
those skills. Therefore, the peace mission was perceived as a great army challenge: it
was the artillerymen’s first deployment experience (compared with the infantry unit,
which had been deployed many times before) and their first infantry experience.
Although both infantry and artillery soldiers viewed peacekeeping as infantry
work, more infantry soldiers adopted this attitude than artillerymen. This supports the
finding of Miller and Moskos that intensively trained combat soldiers are more likely
to adopt the warrior strategy than the humanitarian attitude. Research by Winslow39
about the Canadian airborne in Somalia and by Segal40 of the U.S. National Guard in
the Sinai also backs this finding.
Infantry officer: This is another form of infantry work. It uses fewer tactics. But the particular
way of thinking that we have during training exists here as well.
Because infantry soldiers are taught to patrol at night, under cover, with their weapons
ready to engage, and to avoid contact with the locals, many felt confused when patrol-
ling in daylight, in a straight line, and with their weapons slung down.41 The infantry
platoon commander described it as a “culture shock”:
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Now you walk in a way that everyone can see you. . . . In green [combat training], you can
be dirty and nobody sees. Now you must show your colors . . . the guys need to get used to
it because we became very visible, and in Bosnia, the locals look at us. The soldiers must
realize that their presence is visible, and it is a culture shock.
The combat training helped infantry soldiers feel confident if a worst-case scenario
occurred, but at the same time, it raised their expectations to a level with which the
reality in Bosnia could not compete. The mission in Bosnia was too simple and monot-
onous and much less challenging than the soldiers had expected.
Infantry officer: Yes, it is very hard! And I speak from my own experience: You go from one
extreme to the other. And the gap is getting bigger every time because every year it
becomes more peaceful here. When I look at my UN time, it was very thrilling and so dif-
ferent from today . . . you miss some excitement here because you have experienced the
combat training.42
Therefore, the main problem in the deployment area was how to keep the soldiers busy
and alert during their everyday activities. The Bulldog company commander said that
the real challenge was not the mission itself but how not to get too bored:
For an infantry soldier, [the mission] is more difficult . . . this work is too simple . . . but not
exciting. Infantry exercises are always exciting you always encounter an enemy. . . .
Therefore, when [soldiers] perform a peace mission, they are not attentive enough,
because it is not exciting for them. It is not like the soldier is going to encounter an enemy
and will have to eliminate this enemy. . . . He must patrol around houses, and this is harder
for him.
Boredom, suggest Harris and Segal, is one of the major problems experienced by
those engaged in peacekeeping missions.43 According to their research, boredom was a
dominant theme among MFO (Multinational Force and Observers) soldiers in Sinai.
In his analyses of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), Moskos suggests
that boredom might be most problematic for professional combat-oriented soldiers.44
Boredom is dangerous not only because the soldiers need to stay alert in case of an
emergency situation but because it carries the risk that the bored soldiers will employ
the warrior strategy by provoking situations to create some excitement. An infantry
group commander said,
We are not people with high diplomas, and many people are what I call “from the street,”
including me. They love being outdoors, they look happily for every opportunity to have
some excitement, and therefore, we as their commanders must give them adventures
because otherwise they will look for it themselves! If there is no thrill in this area, they
will go on their own to look for excitement because you need excitement in order to stay
alert, but it does not exist here.
The higher command in the camp did not know how to handle soldiers and lower-rank-
ing officers who were looking for more excitement and wanted to fight. The liaison
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officer in the camp said that the soldiers did not understand that they were the only
ones in the area with constant water and electricity:
If they won’t do the best they can for the locals, they will go back home at the end of the
deployment and will ask themselves why they spent half a year here. What we are doing
here is the other side of infantry work, although it is not easy for the soldiers to come into
contact with people who always say “give me, give me” . . . yet it is so quiet here that I’m
happy that my first deployment was to Angola, a more dangerous place.
Yet even this liaison officer, who was convinced of the importance of the mission and
saw it as a suitable mission for infantry soldiers, said that he is happy that he had expe-
rienced a more combatlike situation in Angola before. Indeed, soldiers and command-
ers who had been deployed on dangerous missions enjoyed a higher status as a result.
To alleviate the boredom and frustration, the soldiers escaped by overdoing exer-
cise and engaging in war simulation and war games. The camp’s doctor said,
They [the soldiers] want to do something and have nothing to do and then they spend most
of the day in the gym. They do sports all day and then you get people with muscle pain and
I ask them . . . maybe you should do less sport. “Yes, but what should I do then?” . . . They
want to be physically busy . . . to release their energy.
The bulletin board of the military camp was covered with photos that had been
taken during a big military exercise near Sarajevo. In the exercise, Dutch and Italian
soldiers had participated in a simulation of escalation in the peace mission. Both units
took turns playing the rioters and the soldiers who stop them. This exercise was the
only real action that most of the soldiers actually experienced in Bosnia.
In summary, although both infantry and artillery soldiers viewed peacekeeping as
infantry combat work, more infantry soldiers adopted this attitude. Furthermore,
artillerymen who perceived the mission as combat were more satisfied than infantry
soldiers because they view it as a challenge. In other words, the further soldiers are
from core combat expertise, the more likely they will be satisfied with the
peacekeeping mission.
Humanitarian Strategy
We have nonmilitary missions that the majority of us don’t really want to do.
—The infantry company commander in a briefing to his staff
As we have seen, humanitarian missions differ from combat missions in one
important aspect: the intervening forces must cooperate with the local population.
While war is a black-and-white situation, “us” versus “them” and “good” versus
“evil,” peace operations are much more elaborate and therefore demand a different
and more complex attitude. Therefore, the humanitarian-strategy attitude requires the
soldier to employ more elaborate skills than a combat situation does.
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Soldiers who maintained a humanitarian attitude believe that a peacekeeper should
think in a broader and more complex way. He or she should not just obey orders but
also take initiative and have more understanding of complex situations and be more
“human” when handling the locals. This attitude was less common among soldiers
than was the warrior strategy.
Infantry soldier: You must be more human and think in a broader way. . . . If for example you
must set up a roadblock and not let people pass but you know that three of the people actu-
ally live in the houses there, then you know that you can let these three pass. In this kind of
situation, you have to think more.
Infantry soldier: A good peacekeeping soldier is someone who can understand the situation
here. . . . He must commit himself to make it better for the people here.
However, artillerymen more than infantrymen tend to view the mission as humanitar-
ian. Artillery soldiers who had the humanitarian attitude also viewed their mission as a
commitment to act on behalf of the local population by doing their best to deal with the
fuzzy environment.
Artillery group commander: It is . . . harder because you must think further, understand more.
As artilleryman, if you have to stop a bomb or a grenade with the cannon, it really doesn’t
matter what you think at that moment. But the moment that you let a hand grenade
through the deployment area, then you must think twice before you do anything.
Artillery battery commander: The soldiers must be independent . . . and self-motivated. If a
car comes to the checkpoint and it looks suspicious, then you should stop it, warn the oth-
ers to take shelter, and they must act immediately. Therefore, the soldiers . . . must know
how to make a quick decision. . . . And you cannot train them for all the situations, and
therefore, they must know how to think independently.
Since the soldier does not have a clear enemy and has to deal with a civilian population,
the mission is more complicated and demands a different set of skills than combat
training. Therefore, all the combat scenarios for which the soldier was educated and
trained are no longer relevant, and he or she is forced to improvise.45 While many
infantrymen felt threatened and confused in performing the humanitarian aspects of
the mission, more artillerymen viewed it in humanitarian, nonmilitary terms. This
result resembles Miller and Moskos’s finding that women and black men were more
likely to adopt humanitarian strategies than warrior attitudes.46 In other words, the fur-
ther soldiers are from core combat expertise, the more likely they will adopt a humani-
tarian attitude. Artillery soldiers who did not have core infantry expertise viewed the
mission in more humanitarian terms and therefore were more satisfied and motivated
in their mission.
Peacekeeping as a Civilian or Even Feminine Job
Even female soldiers can do peacekeeping missions.
—Infantry soldier
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Some infantry soldiers even went a step further by declaring that the mission was
not masculine enough and did not fit combat soldiers. For them, the mission demanded
social skills typical of civilians, such as “chatting in a pub” or “being a journalist,” and
also verbal (and possibly feminine) skills that they lacked, in contrast to the physical
and practical nature of infantry work. An infantry soldier said,
A good peacekeeper is someone who can speak good English! [laughs] who can commu-
nicate well with the interpreter and who is very social . . . who can get along with the inter-
preter, and with the local people. Therefore, a peace mission demands more social skills
than [infantry] work . . . it is actually the same as going out on the weekends! In the week-
ends, you speak with your friends about what you did this week and what you are about to
do. After all, you talk with your girlfriend about everything, it is just that here you do it
with foreign people and you actually ask the same questions!
If peacekeeping demands qualities such as chatting in the pub or speaking with a girl-
friend, it is not a job for a combat soldier or even for a man—because a woman, accord-
ing to this soldier, could chat better. This attitude reflects the soldiers’ helplessness in
the deployment where they are not sure what the rules of the game are. An infantry
NCO expressed this confusion:
We are now more like a journalist with a weapon on his back. Usually, we are infantry sol-
diers, we have weapons in our hands, and we shoot. But now we have it on our back . . . not
more than that.
Infantry soldiers also felt physically exposed since they were not well armed. They
could not carry their rifles in front like infantrymen normally do, and they felt that they
did not have proper weapons. As one infantry soldier said, “The English have 25mm
and cannons, they have antitanks [weapons] and tanks and we [only] have APCs!”47
Hence, some of the infantry soldiers felt their equipment would be insufficient in the
case of escalation.
The bulk of literature in military sociology, starting with Janowitz and continuing
with his students Moskos and Segal, describes the peace mission in terms of a combat
versus constabulary role. Yet none of the soldiers in Grizzly and Bulldog used this
image. Instead, they chose an even less combatlike image (in their eyes): that of a jour-
nalist or social worker who is as remote as possible from combat situations. These
images explain better than anything else to what extent this mission did not appear
appropriate for combat soldiers, especially infantry.
This section (summarized in Table 3) has shown how artillery soldiers were gener-
ally more satisfied with the peace mission than were infantry soldiers. Artillerymen,
who are remote from infantry combat core expertise, saw the mission either as a chal-
lenging combat experience or as a satisfying humanitarian mission. Infantrymen, who
are trained for combat, experienced the mission as a disappointing combat experience
or as a civilian or feminine job.
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Conclusions
This article argues that the Dutch army focuses its activity on peacekeeping, while
using a traditional rhetoric of violence and war making. Consequently, there has
developed within army culture an inherent tension between what is perceived by sol-
diers as the real army, which performs combat roles, and the nonaggressive and even
feminine army, which performs peacekeeping operations. The army, which is still
traumatized by the tragedy of Srebrenica, clings to its combat-oriented self-image by
fostering masculine behavior among soldiers and by focusing on combat training and
rhetoric. Even training explicitly designed for peacekeeping missions takes the shape
of combat exercises and does not prepare soldiers for deployment in postconflict situ-
ations. This training leads soldiers to believe that peacekeeping duty will consist of
exciting combat missions rather than the boring day-to-day routine that they encoun-
ter once deployed. Not encountering what they expected, infantry soldiers feel dissat-
isfied and even bitter about their mission. Artillerymen, on the other hand, whose tra-
ditional roles focus less on direct confrontation and interaction with the enemy (or
even with civilians, friendly or hostile), and whose self-image is less vigorously
masculine and combatlike, are more satisfied with peacekeeping missions.
Conformity to Dutch society’s peace perceptions can conflict with the army’s
actual activity and its institutional image, which contains two major elements: a mas-
culine image and a culture of violence. Combat units find it difficult and even undesir-
able to make the necessary transformation to peace missions and to abandon a combat-
oriented self-image. Although peace missions are almost the only option left for the
army, soldiers still follow the combat model. For them, combat not peacekeeping is
what makes the army relevant and legitimate.
Studying how peacekeepers are trained for combat contributes to the recent record
of peacekeeping deployments, which has been fraught with conflict, human rights
violations, and mission failure—that is, the Belgians in Rwanda and the Italians,
Americans, and Canadians in Somalia. Understanding the culture and organization of
peacekeeping forces will help to change training methods and to better suit them to
their role.
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Table 3
Soldiers’ Attitudes toward the Mission and Consequential Level of Satisfaction
Perception of the Mission
Combat Humanitarian Civilian or Feminine Job
Infantry (Bulldog) Dissatisfied NAa Dissatisfied
Artillery (Grizzly) Satisfied Satisfied NA
a. Only a few infantry soldiers perceived the mission as humanitarian.
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